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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis, I will investigate how the Ultras, a group of organized and nationalistic 
Egyptian football fans who are widely credited with having played a major part in the more 
physical aspects of the Egyptian uprising (Woltering 2013), became politicized and significant 
actors in the 2011 Egyptian revolution. The Ultras, as hard-core soccer supporters, have the ethos 
of fanatical commitment towards their respective clubs (Jerzak 2013). In the case of Egypt, most 
of these Ultras are associated with the two largest soccer clubs, Al-Ahly and Al-Zamalek.  I will 
analyze what political ideologies and social and economic factors have affected the mobilization 
of the Ultras, and assess whether the Ultras have specific sustainable political objectives and 
organizational leadership strategies to be viable Egyptian political actors.  Interrelated factors, 
such as political beliefs, socio-economic status, educational level, organizational structure, 
gender, and age will be used to understand the coalescence of the Ultras as a significant political 
force during and after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. This analysis will provide a fundamental 
understanding of how the Ultras transformed into revolutionary actors, through their autonomy 
in public spaces, and why this dissent became an organized and influential political movement 
that transitioned from the soccer stadiums to the public forums of political protest. I will use 
semi-structured interviews, with academicians and Ultra leaders, and an analysis of published 
data and sources to understand how the Ultras transformed into revolutionary actors, and whether 
they will have a sustainable and meaningful political impact on the Egyptian political scene.   
I became interested in this topic by closely observing and following the 2011 revolution 
and post-revolutionary aftermath in Egypt. During the revolution, Mubarak’s authoritarian 
regime and his security forces specifically targeted the Ultras.  They were perceived as a visible 
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threat to Mubarak’s regime in the public space of soccer stadiums.  Soccer stadiums had been 
one of the few public venues where large crowds could assemble, and the Ultras utilized these 
spaces to clash with security forces of the regime. The clashes with the security forces had little 
to do with soccer games, but were a manifestation of the Ultras’ frustration with the iron handed 
and violent response of the security forces towards the Ultras that included imprisonment, 
torture, and suppression of any dissent (Jerzak 2013). Sport and politics coalesced, as these civic 
expressions of opposition became part of a multifaceted national protest and civic protest against 
the Mubarak regime.   
The Evolution of the Ultras as a Political Force  
Ultra soccer fans have changed the nature of the soccer fan culture, not only in Egypt, but 
globally. Ultras have become a major aspect of global soccer fans’ culture. They have helped 
change the culture of the game in countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Argentina, 
Serbia, Turkey, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt.  The essential role of soccer in political life of 
Egypt goes more than a hundred years back, to the anti-colonial struggle in the beginning of the 
last millennium (Tuastad 2013). When Al-Ahly sport club was founded in 1907, the club was 
used as a cover for political activists fighting against British colonial rule. Student unions formed 
a core of the anticolonial struggle, but their unions needed premises where they congregated and 
planned activities, where they would not be harassed by the British colonial authorities (Tuastad 
2013).   
After the 1952 revolution, a large percentage of the Egyptian population continued to 
identify and feel connected with the fortunes of Al-Ahly (El Zatmah and Jerzak 2013). As a 
result, soccer culture became part and parcel of Egypt’s popular and national culture in the 
sixties and seventies (El Zatmah 2013). In the early 2000s, however, there was a social and 
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political transformation of young fans of popular Egyptian soccer clubs. Young fans started two 
main ultra groups: Al Ahlawi Ultras of Al-Ahly and the White Knights Ultras of the Zamalek. 
The rise of the Ultras and their politicization was a direct response to the heavy handed and 
repressive practices of Mubarak’s security forces at soccer stadiums and in other public forums. 
These groups became politicized through violent confrontations with the police, the state’s chief 
representatives in the public arena. By seeking autonomy in the public spaces of Egyptian 
stadiums, the Ultras were reacting against the daily humiliations in Mubarak’s Egypt, such as 
police surveillance, physical degradation, verbal abuse, and arrest with indefinite jail detention 
(Ismail 2012; Jerzak 2013). This rise of the Ultras movements in Egypt came at a time when 
political activist groups, such as April 6th, Kifya, and the Muslim Brotherhood began to organize 
themselves in open opposition to Mubarak’s regime (El Zatmah 2013). All of these political 
organizations had significant youth participation. These youth groups organized public street 
demonstrations through social media (Ezbawy 2012). On January 25th, 2011, which is considered 
the start of the Egyptian Revolution, youth with the movement took to the streets by the millions. 
These public demonstrations were significantly strengthened by the participation of Al Ahly and 
Al Zamalak Ultras (Ezbawy 2012). The activists from the different political parties had secured 
their participation and they actively fought in pitched street battles with the security forces. 
Through the efforts of the Ultras, the security forces could never reclaim Tahrir square (Ezbawy 
2012). This was significant because different political factions at the start of the revolution were 
cooperating with each other, and they also foresaw the Ultras both as supporters and street 
fighters.  
The Egyptian Revolution deepened the Ultras’ political involvement, giving these groups 
the ambition and opportunity to confront the authoritarian state’s entire presence in the public 
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sphere. In the post-revolutionary era, many Ultra members continued to seek civic autonomy by 
opposing the authoritarian tendencies of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). The 
Ultras were part and parcel of the continued rise in youth-oriented social and political 
movements that came to challenge the SCAF in the post-Mubarak era. The Ultras continued as 
one of the popular forms of this dissent, and they were recruited by the different political 
movements (Elgohari 2013). On February 1, 2012 a massacre occurred in the Port Said stadium 
during a match between Al Ahly and Al Masry, and it resulted in 72 fatalities and more than 100 
injuries. This was widely seen as retribution by SCAF and the security forces against Ultra 
groups of al Ahly and Al for their political role in the 2011 revolution, and it was reminiscent of 
the violence that the security forces had used against the Ultras before the Revolution  (Elgohari 
2013).   
Methodology 
Due to the multifaceted aspects of trying to understand how the Ultras evolved into a 
cohesive political force, I have used a combination of primary and secondary sources and semi-
structured interviews with Ultra members and academicians for a qualitative assessment of their 
perspectives on the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and post-revolution era.  Secondary sources, 
which will primarily be journal articles, book chapters, and news articles will be reviewed and 
analyzed to obtain a fundamental understanding to delineate the specific factors that led to the 
Ultras coalescing into significant political actors on the Egyptian political scene. These 
characteristics will be classified in terms of socio-economic status, political affiliation and 
motivation, organizational capabilities, and gender to understand how the Ultras evolved from 
soccer stadiums to the political arena.  
The semi-structured interview techniques that I used were based on the approaches 
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outlined by Aberbach and Rockman (2002). The goal of the semi-structured technique is to use 
mainly open-ended questions, and to allow the respondents to engage in wide- ranging 
discussions.  The main aim of this technique is, therefore, to probe beneath the surface of the 
response to further understand the reasoning and premises beneath the responses (Aberbach and 
Rockman 2002). In this study, I conducted six semi-structured interviews using open-ended 
questions to allow respondents to fully articulate their answers. The academicians and 
researchers I interviewed were: Professor James Dorsey, a senior fellow at the Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, a columnist 
and the author of the widely acclaimed and quoted blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East 
Soccer; Mohamed Elgohari, a leading expert on Egyptian political movements, who has 
completed a master thesis on the Ultras and the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, and is now a political 
researcher at the Hariri institute in Washington DC and a columnist with Jadaliyya;  Shawki al 
Zatmah, a Middle East History Professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara, who has 
published on how the Tersos transitioned to Egyptian Ultras. The Ultras I interviewed were 
Khalid Shalan, a member of Ultras Ahlawys and one of the student leaders who formed a student 
movement, FECU (Faculty of Engineering Cairo University) Revolutionary Movement, after the 
Port Said massacre in February 2011; two Ultras Ahlway members, one of whom is the one web-
master of the Ahlawy Facebook, and both of these Ultras were involved in the 2011 revolution 
and the Port Said massacre. This cross section of academic researchers and Ultras were chosen, 
such that a representative perspective and understanding of the Ultras could be obtained.  
 I also conducted qualitative research through a survey that I sent out to Ultras White 
Knights and Ultras Ahlway. I created a Facebook account under the name Ahmed Bakri, and I 
was able to monitor the Facebook sites used by the Ahlway Ultras. I also distributed the survey 
	   8	  
to the webmasters for distribution on their websites and Facebook accounts. Only ten people 
completed the survey, and therefore it did not provide enough information for a detailed 
understanding of the Ultras.  
The interviews and survey were conducted in English with and the specific issues I discussed 
with the Ultras were: 
• What motivated you to be an Ultra?  And do you think that the Ultras are a political 
force?  
• What were your experiences in the 2011 revolution? 
• Do you think that the Ultras have viable political motivations and goals?  
• What do you believe is the future role of the Ultras in Egyptian politics?  
• How involved were you with politics prior to the revolution? What motivated you to 
become involved in in politics? 
• In what specific political activities do you and did you engage in?  
• What are the goals of your political activism?  
• What do you believe is the future role of the Ultras in Egyptian politics?  
• What role did they play beyond organized demonstrations? Were there specific leaders or 
committees that funneled and organized support?   
• What were the sources of financial or institutional support for the Ultras? 
• Did the Ultras have tangible connections with opposition parties?  
• How large and politically influential are the Ultras?    
• Are the Ultras a major political force?  
The questions for the academicians were:   
• Do you think the Ultras are a political force?  
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• What are their long-term political motivations and objectives? 
• What do you believe is the future role of the Ultras role in Egyptian politics?  
• What role did they play beyond organized demonstrations?  
• How did it transition from soccer pitches to the political arena?  
• Were there specific leaders or committees that funneled and organized support?  
• What were the sources of financial or institutional support? 
• What major factors are continuing to lead to the festering antagonism between the Ultras 
and the security forces? 
• Did the Ultras have tangible connections with opposition parties? Were they affiliated 
with specific political parties or movements? 
• How did the Ultras use popular media and social media to organize?  
These interviews were a mix of direct and indirect questions, and each interview averaged 
approximately an hour.  I conducted the interviews by Skype, and the interviews were recorded 
with a Zoom H-1 audio recorder. This small but targeted interview sampling size provided a 
cross-section of academic insights and personal experiences that provided detailed and diverse 
perspectives into the political identity of the Ultras, and whether they have a long-term impact on 
Egyptian politics.  
This thesis is organized as follows, in Chapter 2, I will conduct a literature review of current 
work related to the Ultras and how political dissatisfaction with Mubarak’s regime was a 
precipitating factor in the Ultras’ political mobilization. In Chapter 3, I will assess through semi-
structured interviews and analyses of available findings the political impact of the Ultras on the 
2011 revolution and post-revolution era. In Chapter 4, I will summarize the major conclusions of 
the research. In Chapter 5, I will recommend future research areas that can be pursued.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
In this chapter, I will review the current literature for the state of knowledge on how the 
Ultras evolved into a significant political force in Egypt. The literature will be reviewed in terms 
of a brief history of Egyptian soccer, and its interwoven relations with Egyptian politics; the 
evolution of passionate apolitical soccer fans, the Tersos, into politicized Ultras; the authoritarian 
practices of the Mubarak regime, and how this shaped the political response of the Ultras; and 
the significant role that the Ultras played in the Egyptian 2011 Revolution and post-Revolution 
era.  
Egyptian Soccer and Political Dissidence 
The essential role of soccer in political life of Egypt goes more than a hundred years 
back, to the anti-colonial struggle in the beginning of the last millennium (Tuastad 2013). When 
the Al-Ahly sport club was founded in 1907, it was also used as a cover for political activists 
fighting against British colonial rule. Student unions formed a core of the anticolonial struggle, 
and their unions needed premises where they could safely congregate and plan activities 
(Tuastad 2013). Al-Ahly, which means the national in Arabic, was founded by these nationalistic 
students and sympathetic Egyptian middle-class professionals, and not under the patronage of the 
King, as was the case for other sporting clubs, such as Al-Gezira an the Shooting Club (Tuastad 
2013).  Clubs, such as Al-Gezira and the Shooting Club, were patronized by exclusive members 
from the royals, the upper classes, and colonial expatriates, for their golf courses, skeet shooting, 
and swimming pools (Tuastad 2013).  The middle classes, in contrast, frequented clubs, such as 
Al-Ahly, and membership was open to the general public. The main sports within Al-Ahly were 
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the more proletarian games of soccer, handball, and basketball. The Egyptian middle class was, 
in general, firmly opposed to the King, since he was viewed as a puppet of the British colonial 
authorities.  Since public protest against the King and the colonial British authorities were 
generally prohibited, dissidents needed public spaces to meet and discuss Egyptian political and 
social developments (Jerzak 2013).   The club facilities of Al-Ahly, which encompassed 
hundreds of acres near the middle of Cairo in Al-Gezirah, came to be one of the main centers 
where political opposition against British colonization could be voiced and marshaled (Jerzak 
2013). Hence, Al-Ahly from its inception was viewed, by the Egyptian masses, as a nationalistic 
symbol and a center of anti-colonialism.  
In 1952, after Egyptian independence from the British and the abdication of King Farouk, 
Al-Ahly gained significant popularity throughout Egypt and the Arab World. This was mainly 
due to its dominance of the local, Arab, and African soccer competitions. The club won 
numerous soccer championships, such as Egyptian Premierships, national cups, and African and 
Arab championships. Al-Ahly also represented Africa three times in the FIFA World Club 
Championships. The popularity of Al-Ahly with the Egyptian and Arab masses resulted in a 
fanatical following and an obsession with the club’s athletic fortunes. Al-Ahly’s success in Egypt 
has only been rivaled by the other Cairo club, Zamalek, and matches between these two clubs 
have evolved into the main sport event of the whole Arab world (Tuastad 2013). The clubs 
usually meet at the 80,000 sold out Cairo Stadium, and it is one of the rare moments where no 
people can be found out in the streets of Cairo. These clubs’ popularity has been fueled by large 
general memberships, which are approximately on the order four to five million members for 
both clubs, and government subsidies (Al-Zatmah, 2013). This government support is in the form 
of subsidies for athletes’, administrators’, and coaches’ salaries, and club infrastructure 
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maintenance and development.  This government support, which spanned the authoritarian 
regimes of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak, has been employed, so that soccer could be used as a 
social outlet and a diversion for the masses to head off any political or social dissent.  
The Evolution From Tersos to Ultras  
Up until the late 1990s, the most fanatical fans were known within Egypt’s soccer culture 
as the Terso fans. Within Egypt’s popular culture, the term ‘Terso fans’ referred to the most 
passionate soccer fans of the lower and economically poor classes who could only afford to buy 
third or terso (third in Italian) class tickets, which were the cheapest tickets, at the soccer 
stadiums (El Zatmah 2013). As the popularity of Al-Ahly soared with the masses, after the 1952 
revolution and overthrow of the King, Terso fans began to shape the culture surrounding the 
game, by allowing a large percentage of the Egyptian population to identify and feel connected 
with the fortunes of Al-Ahly (El Zatmah 2013 and Jerzak 2013). As a result, soccer culture 
became further solidified within Egypt’s popular and national culture. Soccer terminology 
became part of the vocabulary of the daily lives of the masses, thereby cementing the Terso 
culture as an integral part of Egyptian popular culture (El Zatmah 2013). The Terso fans’ chants, 
songs and celebrations became rooted in other spheres of Egyptian culture, such as in popular 
songs, cinema, politics, magazines, newspapers, and religious and national celebrations (El 
Zatmah 2013).  
All of these elements cemented the place of soccer as both a national obsession and an 
outlet for the Egyptian masses. The Tersos, however, maintained a largely non-violent culture, 
especially in comparison with the cultures of Latin American and European Ultras, which were 
characterized by hooliganism and violence (El Zatmah 2013). This general nonviolence could 
have been due to the relatively stable economic conditions in Egypt in the early 1960s and 
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1970s. The fervor for Al-Ahly was also reflected to a lesser degree for other clubs, such as Al-
Zamalek, Al-Ismaily, Al-Ittihad, and Port Said. But as El Zatmah (2013) notes, Al-Ahly had the 
most fanatic and largest following, and this was due to their celebrated soccer accomplishments, 
history, and large memberships.   
Beginning in the late 1970s, the Terso culture started to evolve into a new culture due to 
worsening economic conditions and political repression.  As El Zatamah (2013) notes, during 
Sadat’s rule, there was extensive privatization of state supported economic institutions, which 
resulted in greater economic inequality and increased poverty levels. The economic situation 
became so dire that even a third class soccer ticket became a burden for the masses. Furthermore, 
the emerging conservative Islamic ideology in the late 1970s resulted in greater measures of 
gender segregation, which discouraged the participation of women within the Tersos. Thus, the 
small number of women who had been a part of the Terso fans disappeared from the stadiums, 
and by the 1990s the third class seats in the stadium were dominated by young males of the 
lower class, who came to eventually form the majority of these passionate fans. This working 
class dimension of the male dominated fans was an essential factor in the evolution of these 
Tersos, since it added a lower class and male dominated socio-economic component to the 
previously apolitical Tersos.  
The Political and Socio-Economic Motivation of the Ultras Fans  
In the early 2000s, during the authoritarian Mubarak regime, the Ultras coalesced into 
cohesive and distinct groups. Young fans of the popular Egyptian soccer clubs started two main 
ultra groups: Al Ahlawi Ultras of the Ahly and the White Knights Ultras of the rival Carian club, 
Zamalek. One of the main factors that resulted in this transformation was a general sense of 
alienation due to the repressive political practices of the Mubarak regime. Egyptian youth, like 
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many other Egyptians, felt that the political system did not represent them, and it was important 
for them to find an entity or a body to belong to (Elgohari 2013). They were looking for a 
collective alternative to the state, where they could express and vent their opinions and 
frustrations.  
The Ultra groups brought together young and mostly underprivileged men, giving these 
youths an opportunity to form community ties through soccer, and these collective ties of support 
were not available through other social and political institutions in Egypt. Dorsey succinctly 
sums up the typical Ultra as: 
Soccer is bigger than politics. It’s about escapism. The average Ahly fan is a guy who 
lives in a one bedroom flat with his wife, mother-in-law, and five kids. He is paid 
minimum wage and his life sucks. The only good thing about his life is that for two hours 
on a Friday he goes to the stadium and watches Ahly. People suffer, but when Ahly wins 
they smile. (Dorsey 2012a). 
 
This description encapsulates how soccer in Egypt was the only outlet for economically and 
socially repressed males. The living and economic frustrations of these Ultras were not going to 
be addressed by the government, and they could only alleviate some of their frustrations by their 
fanatical support of their club.  Ultra groups could bring together these young and economically 
desperate men into organizations, which would provide connections to a larger collective and 
structured community.  
As Al Zatmah further notes (2013), the transformation from Tersos to Ultras on the 
cultural level, signified the transition from the non-violent festive celebrations of the Tersos to 
the more violent marches and celebrations of the Ultras. This radically altered the culture of the 
Ultras in many ways. The Ultras developed much more vulgar chants and songs that were aimed 
at the opposing teams and its fans. These vulgar songs and chants became an essential part of the 
male dominated Ultras culture in the stadiums. These vulgar songs and chants paired with the 
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lighting of Shamarik and other fireworks, became a central element to Ultras culture, and marked 
a marked shift towards violence. Shamarikh were lit to celebrate scoring a goal, to energize the 
fans, and to intimidate opposing fans and teams. Shamarikh came to cause many injuries among 
the Ultras and fans, and more often than not the stadium benches were purposely set ablaze by 
the Ultras. Shamarikh were often thrown at players and referees on the field and towards the 
opposing Ultras, and the police forces that secured the matches. This led to violent 
confrontations with the police and security forces at soccer stadiums, and it reinforced the Ultras’ 
ethos of resistance and community (Jerzak 2013). This form of collective resistance against the 
government was focused on viewing the police and the security forces as the enemy, and this 
was an initial step of the Ultras’ politicization.  
The Ultras and Conflict with Government Institutions and Security Forces  
Fireworks and fire blazes were used by the Ultras to further escalate their confrontations 
with the security forces and clubs. Fireworks and fire blazes in stadiums are prohibited by 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), and continental soccer associations 
including the Confederation of African Football (CAF) and the Egyptian national soccer 
associations.  Heavy fines were imposed by the Egyptian Football Association (EFA), the CAF 
and the FIFA on the clubs’ Ultras, who used fireworks and fire blazes. In international soccer, 
clubs are punished for the transgressions of their fans. Punishments and sanctions can include 
fines, prohibition from international competitions, and games that have to be played in empty 
stadiums (FIFA 2014). Hence, these transgressions pitted the Ultras against the club 
administrators and the security forces, since the Ultras were seen as a threat to state security, the 
clubs’ financial stability and reputation, and Egypt’s standing within the international soccer 
community.  
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The Egyptian autocratic state, under Mubarak had also developed a dominant power 
relation with the goal of suppressing actors, such as the Ultras, who would be seen as challenging 
any vestige of state authority. As Elgohari notes, collective organizations were not tolerated and 
the state used whatever measures were needed to ensure that protests did not evolve into 
anything larger, such as public demonstrations or protests against the state (Elgohari 2012). Any 
larger gathering tended to make the authorities nervous, since any attacks on the security forces 
would be seen as an attack on the regime. 
The Ultras used these threats of penalties and punishment by international and national 
governing soccer boards to put financial pressure and assert power over the clubs administrators 
to force them to meet their demands. After the 1952 Egyptian revolution, all clubs in Egypt were 
nationalized, and the appointment of club administrators had to be approved by the government. 
Club management was, therefore, seen as an extension of the heavy handed and repressive 
government (Elgohari 2012). As Al Zatmah also notes, the Ultras use of fireworks during the 
games, was used to cause financial damage to their respective clubs to force them to meet their 
demands, which usually consisted of either firing the coach, preventing player transfers, or 
demanding punishments or rewards for particular players (Al Zatmah 2013). These penalties 
have been costly to the clubs’ budgets, have run into millions of dollars, and have caused severe 
financial strains on Egyptian clubs (Al Zatmah 2013). Since, the club administrators had to be 
approved by the government, the pressures of the Ultras on these administrators and sports 
officials were perceived as a direct challenge to governmental authority. The Ultras, through 
their violent actions, were challenging the government security forces in the stadiums and the 
government representatives in the club boardrooms.  
The Ultra groups became increasingly further politicized, in the early 2000s, as they 
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sought more autonomy and visibility in public spaces. These groups became politicized through 
increasingly violent confrontations with the police, the state’s chief representatives in the public 
arenas of soccer stadiums. By seeking autonomy in the public spaces of Egyptian stadiums, the 
Ultras were reacting against the daily humiliations in Mubarak’s Egypt, such as police 
surveillance, physical degradation, verbal abuse, and arrest with indefinite jail detentions (Ismail 
2012; Jerzak 2013). Ultras from different clubs reacted against this harassment by mobilizing 
into groups that opposed the security forces at soccer stadiums and other public venues. The 
security forces retaliated by harassing Ultras at stadiums, which led to clashes with the Ultras. 
The security forces and the government feared that any large public gatherings presented a threat 
to the Mubarak regime (Jerzak 2013; Dunmore 2007).  This harassment by the security forces 
reinforced the notion that the security forces were the enemies of the Ultras, and this was another 
step in the continued politicization of the Ultras (Jerzak 2013). The confrontations between the 
security forces and the Ultras in the public stadium venues were significant, because these were 
the only public forums where the security forces were challenged by thousands of hostile 
Egyptians.  The Al-Ahly Ultras’ confrontation with the government significantly escalated in 
2009, when during a match with their main rival, Zamalek, they released banners and chanted 
slogans in support of the Palestinians in Gaza during an Israeli siege. Solidarity demonstrations 
with the Palestinians were banned during the Mubarak regime, and fearing for their relations 
with Western sponsors and that demonstrations could go out of hand – the police cracked down 
on the Ultras, arresting hundreds of them (Tuastad 2013). This marked another significant 
milestone in the politicization of the Ultras; they were taking a public stand on an issue that 
resonated with the majority Egyptians and Arabs. The crackdown by Mubarak’s regime also 
underscored how any public dissent was immediately confronted with violence and arrests.  
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The Ultras and The 2011 Egyptian Revolution  
Until January 2011, the anti-government sentiments and stadium violence that came to 
characterize the Ultras groups was mostly expressed against the security forces securing the 
soccer matches (El Zatmah 2013). With the outbreak of the Egyptian revolution on 25 January 
2011, a more politically charged form of activism of the Ultras emerged, which had nothing to 
do with the fortunes of any Egyptian soccer clubs. Political activist groups from all across the 
Egyptian political spectrum, such as April 6th, Kifya, and the Muslim Brotherhood began to 
organize themselves in open opposition to Mubarak’s three decade long grip on power (El 
Zatmah 2013). The youth groups, within these movements, organized public street 
demonstrations through social media and word of mouth (Ezbawy 2012). On January 25th, 2011, 
which is considered the start of the Egyptian Revolution, mass demonstrators took to the streets 
by the hundreds of thousands. These public demonstrations were significantly strengthened by 
the participation of Al Ahly and Al Zamalak Ultras (Ezbawy 2012). The activists from the 
different political parties had secured their participation by appealing to their sense of injustice 
and hatred of the security forces (El-Zatmah 2013) This was significant, because normally 
divided political factions were cooperating with each other, and they also foresaw the Ultras both 
as political supporters, experienced street fighters, and organized agitators.  
The Ultras played a central role in public demonstrations and securing Tahrir Square, the 
center of public demonstrations, in the January Revolution.  “More importantly, the Ultras came 
to play an important role in the success of the revolution during the first 18 days of 
demonstrations that would ultimately force President Mubarak to resign” (El-Zatmah 2013).  The 
Ultras were active and effective street fighters during the clashes with security forces on the Qasr 
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al-Nile bridge (a critical pathway to Tahrir square), which allowed the masses to flood into 
Tahrir Square, and they repelled the security forces at a major pitched street battle, which 
became known Mawqi‘at al-Jamal (The Camel Battle) on February 3, 2011.  In this battle, 
government paid thugs riding on camels and horses and armed with swords, long knives, and 
chains attacked and killed demonstrators in an attempt to disperse them (El Zatmah 2013). 
However, these government thugs could never reclaim Tahrir Square, because Ultra 
demonstrators from Al Ahly and Zamalek would not allow it (Ezbawy 2012). The Ultras, as 
street fighters, had essentially secured the defeat of the Egyptian security forces, and driven them 
from Tahrir Square, the center of the largest public demonstrations during the revolution.  
Thus, the 2011 Revolution was a turning point for the Ultras groups. The Ultras’ 
disenchantment with the public security institutions was transformed into a sudden engagement 
with politics and political dissidents during the January 25, 2011 revolution. As El-Sherif (2012) 
notes, the Ultras with their group mentality and rebellious attitude were primed, before the 
revolution, to take on the security forces. In the early stages of the 2011 revolution, their political 
motivation was not aligned with any one political movement (Jerzak 2013). The Ultras’ political 
orientation was initially distinguished strictly by a hatred of the security forces and authoritative 
symbols. Since the early 2000s, the Ultras had openly protested police brutality, corruption, and 
called for the ouster of Mubarak’s regime (Lindsey 2011). This politicization was a direct 
challenge to the Mubarak regime, since it exposed how government violence was being used to 
control public spaces (Jerzak 2013). During the revolution, the Ultras with their large number of 
followers, organizational skills, and hatred of the security forces had evolved into street foot 
soldiers for the revolution. They were not initially aligned with any political movement, such as 
the liberal April 6th movement or the conservative Muslim Brotherhood, but their political 
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motivation was based solely on an anarchistic view that the government, as an authoritarian 
symbol, must be brought down (Lindsey 2011). The rise of the Ultras movements in Egypt came 
at a time when political activist groups, especially the youth began to organize themselves in 
opposition to Mubarak’s regime (El Zatmah 803). Hence, the Ultras phenomenon was part and 
parcel of the rise in Egyptian youth-oriented social and political movements that came to 
challenge the Mubarak regime on the eve of the revolution, and dissent from the Ultra groups 
emerged as one of the most popular forms of this opposition to the regime.  
Post 2011 Revolution Era  
The Egyptian Revolution deepened Ultras’ political involvement, giving these groups the 
ambition and opportunity to confront the authoritarian state’s presence in the public sphere. In 
the post-revolutionary era, many Ultra members continued to seek a political voice by opposing 
the authoritarian tendencies of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), the ruling entity 
that succeeded Mubarak.  Furthermore, “with the outbreak of the 2011 revolution, the general 
disenchantment of the Ultras groups with politics turned into a direct engagement with politics, 
and the Ultras groups emerged as the most radical political force among the revolutionary forces 
on the scene” (El Zatmah 2013). The Ultras had gained revolutionary credibility by their 
successful pitched battles with the security forces in Tahrir Square (Bush and Mercer 2012). The 
Ultras were the one group in Tahrir that had extensive experience in confronting security forces 
in public forums. However, this new found political activism would have serious consequences 
for the Ultras. In 2012, due to deliberate negligence by the security forces, 74 Ultra Ahlawy 
soccer fans were killed and 1000 injured in a match in Port Said stadium on 1 February 2012 
between Al-Ahly and Al-Masry.  As Bush and Mercer note, the failure to properly police the 
match at Port Said and to keep rival fans apart was an intentional scheme by security officials to 
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take revenge against their enemies among the Ultras. The security police were said by one 
perpetrator to have hired paid thugs (Bush and Mercer 2012). This traumatic incident further 
politicized both the Al-Ahly and Al Zamalek Ultras by viewing the military council as an 
accessory to this crime, and it further solidified their opposition to the military council and the 
security forces. As Dorsey also notes, the government’s failure to hold senior security officials 
accountable for any of the deaths, further substantiated the reality of the security forces as the 
implementers and enforcers of the repressive Mubarak and SCAF regimes (Dorsey 2012).  The 
Port Said incident earned the Ultras an outpouring of sympathy from the Egyptian public, and it 
again placed the Ultras in the center of the Egyptian political arena, as they sought justice for the 
Port Said deaths. This was also another significant turning point for the Ultras politicization, as it 
was evident that hey were specifically targeted by the military regime, and it fueled their 
demands for justice and retribution.   
Apolitical Terso fans had evolved into Ultras who challenged the security forces in the 
public venues of soccer stadiums. These Ultras, mostly from Al-Ahly and Zamalek, transformed 
into an autonomous source of power with a strong voice of public dissent against the security 
forces of the Mubarak regime. The interrelated factors of socio-economic status, educational 
level, gender, and age led to the coalescence of the Ultras as a significant political force during 
and after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. They played a critical role in the Egyptian Revolution 
by joining the demonstrations in large numbers and by providing organized and motivated 
demonstrators. More significantly, they were the foot soldiers that fought and defeated the 
security forces in critical locations, such as Tahrir Square. After the revolution, they continued to 
engage the corrupt security forces, and they were part of a continuing struggle against the 
repressive remnants of the security forces and institutions.  
	   23	  
One of the key elements that has not been clearly understood, however, is whether the 
Ultras have specific sustainable political objectives, and how they are interacting with the 
different political actors and parties in Egypt.  As I have noted earlier, the current literature 
addresses the history of the Ultras and their formation, and their evolution from Tersos to Ultras. 
The cited investigations also discuss their forms of organized dissent before and after the 2011 
revolution, and their continuing conflict with the government and security forces. It has, 
however, not been clearly established whether the Ultras are a viable and long-term political 
constituency with distinct ideologies and objectives, or whether they are merely young angry 
males who want to continually challenge any political authority. Furthermore, previous studies 
have not clearly identified whether the Ultras have an established leadership that is driving the 
organization in specific political directions, or whether they are aligned with other Egyptian 
political movements.  
As I have noted earlier, I have used a combination of primary and secondary sources and 
semi-structured interviews with key Ultra leaders and academicians to obtain a fundamental 
understanding of what the political ideologies of the Ultras are and its potential role and long-
term effects on the Egyptian political scene. These interviews are analyzed and discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3 
RESULTS PART I 
In this chapter, I will analyze through semi-structured interviews with academicians and 
Ultra leaders whether the Ultras have had specific political objectives, which are not related to 
soccer, and how they have attempted to achieve these objectives.  I will also discuss whether 
these attempts and efforts have resulted in them being viable political actors with distinct 
ideologies and influences on the Egyptian political scene. I will analyze what political 
motivations and socio-economic factors have affected the mobilization of the Ultras, and assess 
whether the Ultras have specific sustainable political objectives to be viable Egyptian political 
actors.   
 In the summer of 2014, I conducted six ninety-minute interviews where I used open-
ended questions to allow the respondents to fully articulate their views on the political impact 
and influences of the Ultras. The academicians and researchers I interviewed were: Professor 
James Dorsey, a senior fellow at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang 
Technological University in Singapore, a columnist and the author of the widely acclaimed and 
quoted blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer; Mohamed Elgohari, an expert on 
Egyptian political movements, who has completed a master’s thesis on the Ultras and the 2011 
Egyptian Revolution, and is now a political researcher at the Hariri Institute in Washington D.C. 
and a columnist with Jadaliyya;  Shawki al Zatmah, a Middle East History Professor at the 
University of California, Santa Barbara, who has published on how the Tersos transitioned to 
Egyptian Ultras. I also interviewed active Ultra leaders. One was a leading member of Ultra 
Ahlawys and a student leader who formed a student movement, FECU (Faculty of Engineering 
Cairo University) Revolutionary Movement, after the Port Said massacre in February 2011; two 
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Ultra Ahlway members, one of whom is the web-master of the Ahlawy Facebook, and both of 
these Ultras were involved in the 2011 Revolution and present at the Port Said massacre.  To 
protect the Ultras from any retributions from the Egyptian government, these Ultras had 
requested their identities not be disclosed. This cross section of academic researchers and Ultra 
leaders provides a perspective and an understanding of the Ultras’ role before, during, and after 
the Egyptian Revolution based on historical analyses, personal experiences and viewpoints.  
Methodology  
I conducted these semi-structured interviews through Skype video and the audio portions 
were recorded with Garage Band. Based on my interview transcriptions, I coded these 
interviews.  These interviews were open coded system based on the following seven categories:  
political beliefs, socio-economic status, educational level, organizational strategies, gender, and 
age, and employment status. These categories emerged as a result of the combined process of 
making thematic associations with the interview responses and how they were related with the 
relevant published literature. Based on my findings from the coded interviews, I organized my 
findings into three interrelated categories: the Ultras’ political motivations, the effects of socio-
economic status on the formation and mobilization of the Ultras, and the organizational strategies 
of the Ultras both inside and outside of the soccer stadiums. Each one of these three categories 
are related to all the coding factors, and these three categories have been formulated to address 
what the Ultras’ political motivations are, why socio-economic factors affected the formation 
and mobilization of the Ultras, and how the specific organizational strategies that the Ultras 
employed during and after the 2011 Egyptian revolution enabled them to attempt to attain their 
political objectives. This Chapter is organized as follows: Analyses the interviews based on each 
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of the three categories is presented in Sections 3.1-3.2, and a conclusion of the findings is 
presented in Section 3.3.   
3.1 The Ultras’ Political Motivations  
As noted in Chapter 2, the Ultras had a long history of confronting the security forces 
before the 2011 Egyptian Revolution (Jerzak 2013 and Tuastad 2013) Thus, though individual 
members of the Ultras may not have initially viewed themselves as political, as a collective 
entity they became politicized because of their continuous challenges to the government security 
forces of an autocratic government. The political nature of the Ultras is derived from their 
passionate love and devotion for soccer, and this view that they are the only true fans became a 
political statement, because this further fueled their confrontations with the security forces before 
and after the 2011 Revolution.  The Ultras were one of the few organized entities, before the 
2011 Revolution, not controlled by the government and that by itself was viewed by the 
government as a threat to the government’s stability and survival (Dorsey xxx). Through their 
long years of confrontations with the security forces and the regime, the Ultras had developed 
street fighting capabilities and street survival skills against a formidable array of security forces 
that included forces from the Department of the Interior, the police, the military, and street thugs 
(Dorsey, 2012).  This lack of fear in confronting the security elements of the regime was highly 
political, since the Ultras were fighting the security forces to express their lack of freedom and 
expression and frustration with the repressive practices of the security forces. 
James Dorsey views that the Ultras’ main political motivations is driven by their desire 
for freedom of expression within the publicly controlled autonomous spaces of soccer stadiums. 
He believes that the Ultras’ politicization then evolved due to their violent clashes with the 
security forces. As he states: 
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“Now I think in Egypt, and other Arab autocracies that by definition is a political 
statement, whether they recognized that or not, and put them in direct confrontation with the 
security forces, and with the regime, because they viewed themselves as the only true fans of the 
club and derived with them an ownership claim to the stadium, in a country where there is no 
non-governmental controlled public spaces” (Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014).    
  
 
This politicization of the Ultras is further substantiated by Dorsey’s observation that:  
“They were the only force that not only publically challenged that notion (that there were 
no non-governmentally owned public spaces), but were willing to fight for it, and the result of 
that was that by the time you got to the outpouring against Mubarak they were almost the only 
force that was highly organized and political in its leadership, but also to a degree ranked in file 
of animosity towards the security forces, they were the only force that was street battle hardened, 
so that gave them an organizational asset in the revolt, and it meant that they were in a sense 
shock troops. They were on the square, on the outer defense perimeter and, because of who they 
were and because they stood their ground, they also played a major role in breaking down what 
people called the barricade of fear” (Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014). 
 
The politicization of the Ultras, due to their constant confrontations with the security 
forces started within the stadiums, but as the Revolution evolved, their political motivations went 
beyond confronting the security forces and it crystallized into a movement that was focused on 
dissent and a desire for a new government. The Ultras viewed their participation in the 
Revolution as necessary to save the country from the evils of autocratic rule and police brutality. 
As one Ultra Ahlawy member points out:   
 “Yes of course the Ultras are a political force, because they have a big effect on society 
and had an important role in the 2011 revolution.  We (Ultras Ahlawy) have a specific 
motivation, we do not want to take specific spots in the government, but in the Revolution, we 
wanted to save our country. Ultras is very political, because it is a way for us to express our 
dissatisfaction with the government” (Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014).  
 
These insights by this Ultra member illustrate that their motivations were not, as Dorsey 
alludes to, merely an extension of their activities in and around the autonomous spaces of the 
soccer stadiums. The political motivation of the Ultras was driven by a hatred of the brutality of 
the security forces, who symbolized the ironfisted cruelty of the Mubarak regime. The unique 
aspect of the Ultras’political motivations originates with their love of soccer. As Dorsey notes: 
 
 “Well, if you ask them they (Ultras) will deny that they are a political force. In fact they 
will deny that they have involvement in politics. But most Ultras worldwide have always denied 
that they are political. Now part of that is self-protective, in an autocratic environment, because if 
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they were to say they were political would make them vulnerable. What makes them Ultras and 
unites them as Ultras is the passion for the game. They have a specific power structure, and that 
passion is their focus” (Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014). 
 
The regime’s perception of and reaction against the Ultras also precipitated the 
politicization of Ultras.  The regime before, during, and after the Revolution viewed any 
mobilized movement as a security threat. This can be further corroborated by the observations of 
Zatmah on the power of the Ultras before and during the Revolution. As he notes: 
“Some of the Ultras have specific political ideologies, like liberty and freedom. They 
have a problem with the police, their main goal is to clash with the police, but overall they have a 
problem with the state in general. The police are the expression of the state, so by attacking the 
police they are attacking the state. In other words, they do not believe in the state itself.  This is 
their main political motivation. The state understands the Ultras as a real political power that can 
galvanize the street (Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014).”  
 
The Ultras continued to challenge the authorities, such as during Sisi’s regime. They 
were not afraid to support the Muslim Brotherhood, which Sisi had overthrown in 2013. As 
Zatmah notes, the authorities still fear the Ultras and are reluctant to act against them. Zatmah 
relates the event where Abu Treika, one of Egypt’s best-known players refused to acknowledge a 
government official, and as he describes     
“For instance, you know Mohammed Abu Treika the famous Egyptian player, 
Mohammed Abu Treika challenged the Egyptian regime, he refused to shake the hand of the 
minister of sport during the game, and basically he flipped off the regime (Sisi’ regime), but the 
regime did not do anything to him, because they are worried about the Ultras. Mohammed Abu 
Treika, if there were no Ultras, he would be now in jail, but because of the Ultras, the state does 
not touch him. He challenged the state on the side of the Muslim Brotherhood after that. This 
shows that the Ultras have the power to challenge the state” (Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, 
June 2014). 
 
These observations by Zatmah point out that the authorities were worried about how the 
Ultras would respond to certain situations. Abu Treika was one of the leading soccer players in 
the history of Africa and Egypt, and as such held a special mantle in Egyptian soccer. As Zatmah 
notes, Abu Treika has been highly sympathetic and supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
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incident with the Sports Minister occurred after the June 30th military coup, which overthrew the 
Muslim Brotherhood government.  Even though the government had arrested and killed 
thousands of Muslim Brotherhood supporters, Sisi’s government never sanctioned or confronted 
Abu Treika because they were afraid of the Ultras’ response and political power.  The 
government’s response also implicitly acknowledged that a majority of the Ultras were 
sympathetic with the political views of the Muslim Brotherhood, and that the Ultras identified 
with the Brotherhood’s persecution. This wariness and fear of the Ultras shows how their 
influence has spanned the different regimes from Mubarak to Sisi.   
The Ultras political motivation was driven by their hatred of the authorities and the 
government. Their motivations, before and during the revolution, were driven by their opposition 
to the security forces, the government’s corruption, and lack of support for the Palestinian cause. 
The Ultras may not have a specific political ideology that enable them to be part of a ballot or a 
political party, but they are driven by a desire for personal freedom and expression.  As Dorsey  
states: 
“Well, I think that they agree on very general political motivations, such as greater 
freedoms, opposition to the security forces, anti corruption, and the Palestinian issue. But once 
you go farther beyond those notions, political views among them run the gamut from left to right 
and therefore do they have sustained power as a futbol group. Does this also have a political 
aspect to it? Yes? Are they capable of forming into a political party if you wish? No”.  
  
As Dorsey further notes, the Ultras were the able to break the barricade of fear against 
dissent in public space, but it remains questionable if Ultras’ form of street politics has evolved 
into mainstream politics. As Dorsey notes:   
“That is leaving aside all the problems that groups who engage in street politics have in 
deciding, do you surrender the street and move into main- stream politics? I think if you asked 
many of those from Tahrir Square or those who were in leadership or leading positions in Tahrir 
Square, such as Ultras they probably would feel today that they left the square too early” 
(Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014). 
 
	   31	  
The Ultras’ greatest political influence may be seen in the streets, especially during the 
2011 Revolution. The Ultras were, however, one of the few movements that were highly 
organized and political in its leadership, which gave them political power in the 2011 revolution. 
As it was noted in Chapter 2, the Ultras were recruited by the Muslim Brotherhood, the April 6th 
Movement, and other groups for support in Tahrir Square in the 2011 Revolution.  The main 
reason that the Ultras were recruited was because of their street fighting experiences with the 
authorities. As one of the Ultra leaders states:  
“We have always had clashes with the police. This is the main factor why January 25th 
was a success. When facing protests, the police usually use formations of central security force 
soldiers; they tend to block the marches or the protests. Encircle them and then get everyone 
arrested. So the only people who knew how to break the central security force formations were 
the Ultras. They were accustomed to it. They have always done that with central security forces 
that guard the matches. They always have had a feud with these forces, but they have always 
been able to fight back with the police. They have always been prosecuted by the police. The 
main focus of the Ultras is a feud with the police and with the Ultras having the right to use 
fireworks. Many of the Ultras members have joined the political movements, and many still 
define themselves as revolutionaries” (Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014).  
 
As Dorsey notes, though, there is no one Ultra political entity with one set of ideologies. 
There is a large group Ultras, who have a deep hatred of the iron-fisted security forces, and who 
were sympathetic and supportive of anyone who has opposed government brutality and injustice.  
In Dorsey’s analysis, he believes that the Ultras wished they had been more visible and active in 
Tahrir Square in the 2011 Revolution, but that would required a transition and an organized 
integration into dissident politics.   
Before and during the 2011 Revolution, the politics of the Ultras, however, was mainly 
driven by their bitter antagonism towards the security forces. Their political power and influence 
derived from their organized street fighting skills and clashes.  As Elgohari’s notes:  
 
“I believe that they (the Ultras) are organized around their inherent hatred towards the 
police. One of the founding principles of the Ultras mentality is: all cops are bastards (A.C.A.B 
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movement). So the relationship between the Ultras and the police in Egypt is characterized by 
violence between these two groups. So, I think the Ultras engaged in the Revolution, because the 
revolution was one way for them to be able to show their leverage over the police forces”  
(Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014).  
 
 
Elgohari views the organization of the Ultras as mainly focused around their hatred of the 
security forces, and he discounts that the Ultras’ political motivation is based on any deeply held 
ideologies. In his view, the Ultras involvement in the Revolution was a means of gaining 
leverage over the security forces. The Port Said incident earned the Ultras an outpouring of 
sympathy from the Egyptian public due to the massacre and death of the seventy-seven Ultras. 
That incident again placed the Ultras in the center of the Egyptian political arena, as they sought 
justice for the Port Said deaths. This was also another significant turning point for the Ultras 
politicization, as it was evident that hey were specifically targeted by the military regime, and it 
fueled their demands for justice and retribution. It is evident, based on the Port Said massacre 
and the Mohammed Mahmoud incident, that the Ultras were leading the charge against the 
SCAF and the remnants of the Mubarak regime.  The Ultras actions, after the Port Said and 
Mohammed Mahmoud incidents, indicated a well- organized and vocal political response against 
government brutality.  This is further reinforced by the perspectives of one of the Ahlway Ultras, 
and as he states:  
   “I don’t think that the political situation in Egypt is going to stabilize in the long-
term, and I do not think that this generation is ready to accept the future that is being drawn. I 
believe that there will be another wave, a third revolution, and the Ultras will be a core part of 
this. The political chants of the Ultras are focused on futbol, but others are revolutionary chants. 
In the FECU student movement (Faculty of Engineering at Cairo University movement) we tried 
to claim legal suit in the Port Said massacre. We had one colleague detained in the massacre.  
We have always used the Ultras chants. We have a sit in every morning and chant ultras chants, 
and the horaya  (freedom) song for Ultras Ahlway for hours everyday. The Ultras chants are like 
revolutionary nostalgia songs in addition to five other songs. I do believe that Ultras will join the 
next wave, and that their power will have long-term effects on the political situation in Egypt” 
(Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, May 2014). 
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The Ultra’s leader’s views are those of a political leader and organizer. They had 
transformed stadium chants, slogans, and songs into revolutionary chants that challenged the 
legitimacy of the SCAF and Sisi’s regimes.  This demonstrates that the politicization of the 
Ultras had spawned the creation of other political movements, such as FECU, and that the Ultras 
are motivated to start a new revolution that will result in a fair and just government. These 
beliefs and actions of the Ultras are not those of an anarchistic movement, since their ultimate 
desire is for a fair and politically effective government. The analyses by the academic experts, in 
my opinion, discount the political aspects of the Ultras, since they are not associated with any 
one specific Egyptian political movement, but have sympathies with different political 
movements and parties. The Ultras have actually influenced other Egyptian political movements, 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood and sympathizers of the deposed President Morse, since these 
political movements have started to use the chants and slogans of the Ultras. As noted by an 
Ultra Ahlawy member:  
“These Ultra songs and chants are very popular, they challenge the state. Now new Ultras 
groups have formed, such as Ultras Morsawy (named after the deposed President Morsi), and 
they have begun using the same chants of the Ultras. Many of the ultras members from the 
Zamalek club joined the Morsi campaign and then formed a political group called ah-hrar 
(freedom). All of these groups are modeled after the Ultras, which is why they are political! We 
(Ultras Ahlawy) challenge the state and the police” (Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 
2014). 
 
The political tools and methods used by the Ultras are now being used by dissidents, such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood, who are now, during Sisi’s regime being persecuted by the security 
forces, just as the Ultras have been persecuted and targeted by different Egyptian regimes.  
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3.2 Socio Economic Status and How it Affected the Formation and Mobilization of 
the Ultras  
 
The membership and the participation of the Ultras are also directly related to the high 
rate of youth unemployment. In 2011, nearly half of all Egyptians lived under or just above the 
poverty line, which the World Bank sets at $2 a day (CIA World Fact Book 2011). According to 
the CIA World Fact Book, “despite the relatively high levels of economic growth over the past 
few years, living conditions for the average Egyptian remain poor. (CIA World Fact Book 
2011).” Furthermore, the unemployment rate in Egypt is 13.4 percent of a labor force of 27.3 
million, (Pew Research Center Report 2011).  As the Pew Research center report also stated, 
“Youth constituted 70.8% of the total unemployed, with around 13.6% aged between 15 and 19, 
and 57.2% ranging between 25 and 29 years old” (UNDP). Furthermore, 71% of the unemployed 
in Egypt are holders of academic certificates (UNICEF Egypt). According to UNICEF, this 
youth unemployment rate is one of the highest rates in the world.  
The relation between the socio-economic status of Egypt and the makeup of the Ultras 
can be clearly seen in the interview of one of the Ultra Ahlway leaders:  
         “In 2011, Egypt had the largest percentage of unemployment, like me and my 
friends, most members of Ultras Ahlawy were grappling with that joblessness, destitution, and 
high food prices. This all added to our personal and political discontent, and we expressed this 
through club activities and through being the first people in Tahrir in 2011! The regime and 
country do not care about us, the youth”  (Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014).  
 
 The political power of the Ultras has been growing, before and after the Revolution, due 
to the continuing unemployment of young Egyptians and graduating university students. The 
continuing explosion of unemployed youth has resulted in the continued growth of the Ultras 
after the Revolution.  As the Ultra leader further notes: 
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“There are about 80,000 of us in Ultras Ahlway and the number of members is continuing 
to increase everyday. In Ultras Ahlway, we started out with about 500 people, and now we have 
expanded, because we have nothing else to do!  The numbers are increasing in the last year and 
many people want to enter and be a member since last year. Because of two reasons: 1) Most 
Ultra members are unemployed and have nothing to do, or they are students. Ultras Ahlway is a 
way to do whatever you want and spend your free time. Most of us go to jail for a week or a 
month because of the problems we cause, but I have no job so it does not matter to me. I went to 
jail for a week, and I came out and now I fight the cops harder! (Fareeda Zikry, personal 
interview, June 2014).  
 
As he notes, unemployment and high food prices are leading to political discontent, 
specifically among the youth, and many of these youth have funneling their discontent through 
joining the Ultras. The ranks of the Ultras have swelled before and after the Revolution due to 
high youth unemployment and dissatisfaction. As noted earlier, Egypt has one of the highest 
youth unemployment rates in the world. As the numbers have grown, their clashes with the 
security have increased, and this has further politicized and hardened their opposition to the 
government. (Jerzak 2013). Thus, the Ultras, in a country with governmental control over most 
aspects of public expression, have become an outlet for dissent against their socio-economic 
status of Egypt under the Mubarak regime and the post-revolutionary governments. 
As Zatmah discussed the shift from the Terso’s to Ultras in Egypt in the 1990, he related 
how socio-economic factors affected this shift:   
      “This started to change if you want to understand the condition or the situation for the rise of 
the Ultras, it started with the Tersos in third class (third class was the cheapest seats in Egyptian 
stadiums). This third class was relatively diverse, full of youth and families and women. So it 
was open, but starting in the 1970s, females stopped showing up in the third class seats, even in 
the cinemas, and the theater. This started with the Islamization of the culture. The segregation, 
between the male and female, led to only the males attending the game, and the family and 
women staying at home. So the soccer games were reserved only for the male youth. The youth 
were able to gain power from this, they started to use the most vulgar chants, and do what they 
wanted. This was the start of the formation of the Ultras. The shift from the Ultras to the Tersos 
was fueled by hatred towards the postcolonial state power structures after 1940. But today we 
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have a similar situation. The youth understand that once they finish college, they will be sitting 
around unemployed. They do not have a future in this state; this state is not doing anything for 
them. Some of them would rather immigrate to Europe or die in the Middle of the 
Mediterranean. The contemporary states in the Middle East do not give anything to these youths! 
These kids make up the Ultras, the lower middle class graduates. They have nothing else, except 
the Ultras, you will find a few from the rich classes, but they are mostly from lower middle 
classes. These kids are coming from families where their families can afford to pay a few extra 
pounds to send them to university of Cairo or Alexandria, but they know that after they graduate 
they will have no future, and they will be unemployed”(Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 
2014).   
 
Zatmah succinctly links the socioeconomic impact of the shift from Tersos to Ultras to 
frustrated males with little or no economic opportunities or hopes. The cohesive group dynamics 
of the Ultras was also cemented as the popularity and success of Al-Ahly soared (El Zatmah 
2013 and Jerzak 2013). Soccer terminology became part of the vocabulary of the daily lives of 
the masses through popular songs and chants, thereby cementing the Ultra culture as part of 
Egyptian popular culture (El Zatmah 2013).  All of these interrelated factors of socio-economic 
status, political alienation and dissatisfaction, and cultural popularity led to the Ultras becoming 
an organized and subservient force outside the public spaces of soccer stadiums prior to, during, 
and after the Revolution.  
The political alienation and dissatisfaction of the youth dominated Ultras continues to 
have an effect in post-revolutionary Egypt. As Zatmah notes: 
             “ I want you to understand that the Ultras played a very large political role in the 
revolution, but I want you to know that one specific political color cannot capture them, because 
really they do not have belief of political organization. The economic and social condition was 
very severe in the Middle East. The socio-economic history of Egypt has a direct effect on the 
political make-up of the Ultras. Without satisfying the youth, the Arab Spring will never be 
successful, and countries like Egypt will continue to face problems, because youth are the ones 
who can revolt. The Ultras have essentially become an outlet for these dissatisfied youths.  
 
Thus in Zatmah’s opinion, the Ultras served as a vehicle for the political expression of 
the youth. He believes that they generally are not driven by any one political ideology, but their 
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motivations are directly related to unemployment, socio-economic status, and a hatred of the 
security forces. 
These views are further substantiated by Dorsey, who in his interview noted that: 
“You had an influx of young men who were undereducated, uneducated, unemployed, 
underemployed, for who the security forces were an issue in their daily lives, not just the 
stadiums.  This was an opportunity to vent pent up anger and frustration, and animosity towards 
the security forces and they could act out anger in stadiums, and have the opportunity to be 
crystal clear about their political opinions. These youth formed the mass rank and file of the 
Ultras, and much of their anger towards the state is fueled by unemployment, and their socio-
economic status (Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014).” 
 
 This description specifically links the Egyptian youths’ frustration to unemployment and 
socio-economic status. This frustration is evident in the high unemployment rate of Egyptian 
youth (Pew Research 2011), but the Ultra youth are also driven by political frustration. As 
Elgohari notes: 
“We cannot discard the fact that these Ultras groups mostly consisted of youth members, 
and most of them are involved with the bad politics from the Mubarak regime. The Ultras did not 
announce collectively that they participated in the Revolution, but after the Port Said massacre 
the regime started to target the Ultras. Many members were detained after the Mohammed 
Mahmoud incident (the first Egyptian journalist to be killed in the 2011 Revolution)” (Fareeda 
Zikry, personal interview, June 2014). 
 
The Ultras have been persecuted not only for their confrontations with the security forces, 
but due to their continuing protests of the killing of journalists and the Port Said massacre. This 
is significant because the Ultras’ influence has extended into areas of political dissent that broad 
sectors of the Egyptian political opposition and society have already been involved in.  The Port 
Said massacre highlighted the targeting of the Ultras by the security and the SCAF. Furthermore, 
since no security forces were ever prosecuted for the Port Said crimes, it also highlighted the 
ineffective and corrupt Egyptian judicial system.  
 
 
	   38	  
3.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I analyzed the interrelated aspects of political ideologies and socio-
economic factors that led the Ultras to be viable Egyptian political actors, before, during, and 
after the Egyptian Revolution. Based on my primary sources, I discussed and analyzed how the 
political beliefs, socio-economic status and composition of the Ultras has led to their formation 
and their evolution into a viable political entity and force in Egypt. The Ultras’ political 
motivation is driven by their hatred of the security forces, their desire for free expression, and 
social and economic frustration. 
The Ultras have played a critical role in the 2011January revolution and their continual 
clashes with the security forces and different regimes, since 2011, have rendered them as 
political actors that the state fears. This fear is based both on the inability of the different regimes 
to control the Ultras and the Ultras’ extensive experience and success in confronting the security 
forces.  
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Chapter 4 
 
RESULTS PART I 
 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the organizational strategies that the Ultras have used in their 
efforts to be viable political actors with distinct ideologies and influences on the Egyptian 
political scene. I analyze how these organizational strategies have affected the mobilization of 
the Ultras, and what organizational leadership approaches the Ultras’ have used to attain their 
political objectives. This was another step in understanding why and how the Ultras formed as a 
political force.  I use primary sources from the semi-structured interviews that I conducted in 
summer 2014 and secondary sources, such as scholarly journals and media sources, to 
understand and delineate the political organizational structure and strategies of the Ultras.  I will 
discuss how the Ultras have raised funds to sustain their operational activities and their 
interactions and outreach with other political parties and dissidents in Egypt. Furthermore, I will 
assess specific motivational and mobilization strategies and tactics of the Ultras, such as the use 
of songs, chants, fireworks, and graffiti. I find that these organizational strategies express he 
political interests of the Ultras.  
 
4.1 Organizational Strategies  
 
The political motivation, which is driven by the Ultras hatred of the security forces,  is 
directly related to how they organize themselves both inside and outside the soccer stadiums. 
The Ultras’ organizational strategy is essentially a division of labor that is focused on assigning 
the different activities related to chants, songs, and the use of fireworks to the Ultras members. 
There are small groups called Top Boys, which divide up the work needed to sustain the whole. 
These small groups are highly secretive, and usually operate independently from other groups 
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within the Ultras (Bashir 2011).  Work assignments are grouped around the Top Boys, who are 
tasked with making and designing banners, flags, composing chants, organizing trips, selling 
merchandise, collecting donations and managing social media activities. This organizational 
structure is also used outside the stadium, when the Ultras organize large-scale street 
demonstrations (Bashir 2012). Subgroups are organized based on assignations pertaining to 
security, chants, and rock and firework throwers.  
The Ultras make their own t-shirts, soccer kits, mementos, and music, and they sell them 
to generate their own funding to be financially independent, as part of their organizational 
strategy.  As Bashir notes, the Ultras cooperate with sympathetic businessmen and firms to sell 
their merchandise and music (Bashir 2011). These funding mechanisms keep the Ultras 
operational, but, more importantly, these sources are independent of governmental or state 
influences. In addition, the Ultras have developed successful efforts to be independent from the 
officially organized Egyptian soccer clubs, which are controlled or strongly influenced by the 
government. As noted by Dorsey:  
  “The idea with the Ultras is that they are not supported by the fan associations (which are 
funded and supported by the clubs). Each club had a fan association and these clubs were 
provided with transportation-reduced tickets. The Ultras members refused this way of funding, 
because they now see it as a repressive way to control their actions. So now the Ultras groups are 
self-funded. They have membership fees, and they are producing products that commemorate the 
clubs, like t-shirts and jerseys that they sell to members. This is their main source of funding” 
(Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014). 
 
This financial independence has allowed the Ultras to be a self-functioning entity with a 
freedom of expression to simultaneously fanatically support their clubs, criticize the government, 
and harass the security forces. This independence, through their actions, has furthermore 
enshrined them as a political threat to the political system before, during, and after the 2011 
Revolution.  As further underscored by one of the Ultras leaders:  
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  “No, we do not want money from the state. We use products like hats and bags to sell and 
get money to support the team, because we do not want money from anyone that could control us 
in the future” (Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014).   
 
This is noteworthy because the refusal of the Ultras to take state funding has empowered and 
sustained their independence from outside influences.  As noted by Dorsey:  
“The Ultras are self-funded, and they put a premium on independent self-funding. They 
put their own money into the club” (Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014).  
 
The structure of the Ahlaway Ultra, which is the largest Ultra group in Egypt, is highly 
organized and core groups are formed for each of the activities, such as organizing the songs and 
chants in which Ultra members participate (Shahin 2012) A notable feature of the Ahlaway 
Ultras is that there are no specific leaders, leadership groups, or hierarchical leadership 
structures.  The Ahlaway Ultras are organized around the amount of time that members commit 
to attending club activities and matches, including attending club athletic activities, such as 
soccer, basketball, and handball games. Each athletic activity and team has a central core Ultra 
organization, which manages attendance, stadium seating, transportation to and from events, 
placards, songs, and chants (Shahin 2012).  As Shahin notes, soccer has the most Ultra followers, 
and usually for a large club like El-Ahly, tens of thousands of Ultra followers usually attend 
Premier Division games. For sports, such as handball and basketball followers are on the order of 
thousands (Shahin 2012).  This organizational structure is substantiated by one of the Ultras 
Ahlway  leader who states: 
“The Ultras group is not hierarchal, it looks like a kind of core group that are considered 
the leaders of the group, and also there is another circle that is within this larger circle in this area 
of Egypt. The largest circle is the ordinary members (sic) of such a group. So to be a leader of 
the Ultras is not difficult, it is dependent on how much time you dedicate to the activities within 
the group. The group was formed around the absence of any kind of specified political and social 
structure, so these groups could not find anybody or channel, or institution that could represent 
them, so the Ultras idea, and it is an international movement, was formed in 2007 was only about 
sports and the love for the club, but it became an outlet to express political frustrations as well” 
(Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014).  
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Hence, the organizational structure of the Ultras, which was originally set up for 
activities within the stadium, was easily adaptable as an outlet and mechanism for political 
expression and action outside of the stadiums.  As noted earlier, the Ultras use the same 
organizational techniques outside the stadium, as they do inside in the stadium. The major 
difference is that outside the stadium the battles with the security forces are on the streets and 
they involve confrontations that not only include security personnel, but armored vehicles. Due 
to the size of the Ahlawy and the White-Knight Ultras, these two groups are the dominant 
groups, and as Bashir noted, their demonstration usually are on the scale of tens of thousands 
(Bashir 2012).  More importantly because of their financial independence, the Ultras did not 
have to join or be part of other political movements or parties, such as April 6th and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Furthermore, since they did not have or seek any state funding from the 
government, this rendered them as a threatening entity to the authorities. As the Ultra leader 
notes: 
 During the thawra (revolution), even the Ultras Ahlawy and White Knights joined 
together because we hate the government, and all police. We coalesced as one entity, as one 
Egyptian (sic) trying to save the country. We gathered seven hours before the match and 
organized our songs and chants to fight the police. Since 2011, all Ultras are united for this 
cause, because futbol is the only thing we have left, and we cannot let the government control 
this! (citation needed). 
 
As the Ultra leader notes, members from the leading Ultra groups, such as the Ultra Ahlawys and 
the White Knights, were united in their support for the Revolution and their opposition to 
Mubarak’s government.  This point is highly significant because these Ultras, who were from the 
two leading clubs of al-Ahly and al-Zamalek, historically had violent clashes with each other.   
The ideals of the 2011 Revolution of freedom, equality, and economic prosperity were what 
	   44	  
brought and united these usually warring groups.  Give one more sentence to really emphatically 
state what that means for your question and argument. 
A critical important point for understanding the organizational success of the Ultras is 
due to the large percentage of youth who comprise the membership in the Ultras groups.  Since a 
large percentage of the Ultras are youth, this has allowed the Ultras to be a street hardened and 
energetic core of followers, and this is one of the main reasons for their organizational success.  
They are street hardened due to their continuous protests and clashes with the security forces, 
since the 2011 Revolution. As noted by Shahin in his observations on how the Ultra youth 
cooperated with the youth of April 6th and the Muslim Brotherhood,  “The Egyptian youth led the 
January 25 revolutions, the people embraced it, and the military managed it. Various youth 
movements played a central role in calling for protests and organizing the mass mobilization that 
turned the January 25 protests into a people’s revolution ” (Shahin 2012). The Ultras were 
recruited by the youth movements of the leading dissident groups, such as April 6th and the 
Muslim Brotherhood to provide support and security in Tahrir Square during the 2011 
Revolution. As also noted earlier in Chapter 1, the Ultra youth major role in defending Tahrir 
during the Battle of the Camel. They battled the security forces in fierce street battles, they 
maintained security within the Square, they manned first aid stations, and provided food and 
drinks to the demonstrators.  
 
4.2 The Ultra Tools: Slogans, Songs, Graffiti, and Fireworks 
 
Critical elements of the Ultras’ organizational structure is driven by they organize the 
different subgroups pertaining to chants, slogans, songs, shamarikh (fireworks), and graffiti. 
These elements have been used to energize and rally the Ultras and to intimidate the security 
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force and opposing soccer fans. These elements have involved extensive choreography and 
planning. As one of the Ultra leaders notes: 
“There is a website called Ultrahlawy.com and a Facebook page. Before any match--for 
example, a match in the African championship,--there will be a post four days ahead in the 
Facebook page, telling us where we are meeting before the match. We use this meeting point to 
practice the chants. There are flags and banners that we put in the stadium. We go seven hours 
before the match. This is why we hate the cops, because they do not want us to go to the stadium 
early, so this causes a problem. But cops hate us as we hate them! And it really is a big deal, 
because before every match now we burn their cars, we run after them in the streets, we take 
their weapons and machines. (Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014).   
 
As these comments indicate, the Ultras been at war with the security forces and the 
government both within and outside the stadiums, and they come to the stadiums prepared for 
battle. The Ultras use songs, chants, and placards to energize themselves and their followers, and 
this has them psychologically prepared to engaged in confrontations with the security forces.   
Another essential element that the Ultras have used is shamarikh, or fireworks, to 
physically threaten and intimate the security forces. These fireworks have been used to set 
stadium bleachers afire and as projectiles to harm the security forces and damage their armored 
vehicles (Bashir 2011). The shamarikh is the weapon of choice for the Ultras and they view its 
use as empowering and leveling the field against the heavily armed security forces. This point is 
underscored by one of the Ultra leaders, 
“We use fireworks as much as we can inside and outside of the stadium! Because, it is 
our weapon. Each member can make a song and upload it on Facebook. Then the leaders choose 
a song and we memorize and sing it in the stadium. There are special songs for the cops and for 
the SCAF. We use really bad words, to describe that we hate them and that they are losers!” 
(Fareeda Zikry, personal interview, June 2014).  
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The fireworks are, therefore, used as weapons against the security forces, and the 
launching of the fireworks is coordinated with specific songs and chants, with each Ultra group 
assigned specific duties and responsibilities.   
As the images below show, the use of shamarikh is an effective tool of street and stadium 
warfare. In the first image, the Ultras used fireworks to set off large bonfires in the center of 
Cairo in 2012 in protest of the Port Said deaths and massacre. The second image shows how the 
shamarikh were used to damage Al Gouna soccer stadium, where the Ahlawy Ultras had clashed 
with security forces in 2013. The third image shows how the Ultras are being violently 
confronted by the uniformed security forces and other security personnel, known as bultkaiya or 
street thugs, dressed in plainclothes.  The use of these paid street thugs by the security forces is a 
common tactic to infiltrate Ultra gatherings inside the stadiums to sow confusion and to target 
and kill the Ultras (Shahin 2012), and that is what happened in the Port Said massacre.   
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Ahlawy Ultras setting fire to Al Gouna stadium in Al Gouna, Egypt 
Source: Ahram Online June 22, 2013  
  
Ultras protesting Port Said massacre in the center 
of Cairo, 2012. Source: New York Times, March 
13, 2012 
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Security forces battling Ahlawy Ultras during the Port Said Massacre in Port Said, Egypt  
Source: CNN February 2012  
 
  
Need a smoother transition. This next set of paragraphs seems like it might need another 
subhead that discusses “out of stadium political mobilization” Ultra songs and chants have also 
proven to be essential as forms of resistance and expression against pre- and post revolutionary 
regimes, and they have also been used by the Ultras to publicize their resistance against the 
government. One of their most popular songs is Hekayetna, or “our story” 
(www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2hYgkXjdJI&feature=youtu.be), which has had tens of millions 
of hits on YouTube. The song summarizes the Ultras’ history of resistance against the autocratic 
regimes of Egypt. It demonstrates their desire for political freedom and support of the 2011 
Revolution, and their hatred of SCAF for their role in the Port Said massacre.  The song, which I 
directly translated from Arabic, is summarized below as: 
“Soccer when we arrived was lies and deception,   
It was brain numbing and a shield for the authorities.  
They (authorities) tried to beautify it but it resembled the Grief of the country,  
They did not take account for the thousands in the stands.  
Keep Killing our ideas,   
Oppression is everywhere.  
We will never forget your past (police),  
You are the slaves of the regime. 
And when the revolution came, we went and participated in every city, 
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 We died for freedom and the removal of the oppressive regime.  
We never kept quite and will never give up since the regime is still in power. 
The police dogs (from the Ministry of the Interior) are the oppressors and are still everywhere, 
Keep killing the revolution.  
They (police and regime) have killed our dearest friends and dream, in Port Said the victims 
witnessed treachery before their murder.  
They lay witness to the authorities that said either accepts our rule or total chaos will be 
everywhere,  
Keep killing the revolution.   
Keep killing the idea, The word Freedom is crazy. 
But no matter how cruel and mighty the jailor, my voice for freedom is even mightier,  
Keep killing the revolution.  
Keep killing the idea,  
We chanted in front of millions “down with the regime that kills generation after generation. ” 
They trapped us and plotted against us,  
Keep killing the revolution.  
Keep killing the Idea,  
In Port Said the authority said either accept our rule or will set you into total chaos, 
They thought that the people would chose the regime and bow down to the police as was done in 
the past. 
I will never let you feel safe as an authority and will never forget what you have done to us, I 
will never allow you to rule us again one more day,  
Keep setting your police on us.   
They all died with the dream of ending the regimes grip on the country, 
Oh SCAF, you bastards.  
You sold the blood of the martyrs in return for protecting your regime that you are part of, Oh 
SCAF you are bastards. 
 
 This song illustrates the deep hatred of the political authorities by the Ultras. It is focused 
on the brutality of the security forces, SCAF, and the Port Said massacre. There is not one stanza 
or passage related to a specific soccer game or result.  It is a political call to collective action 
used to mobilize the Ultras inside and outside stadium, and to serve as a political and historical 
tract of their clashes and demonstrations. The song is not only heard on YouTube, but it is 
distributed and sold on CDs throughout the Arab world (Bashir 2012).The repeated reference to 
the Port Said atrocities and the characterization of the government as  “the regime that kills 
generation after generation,” strikes a resonant chord with Egyptians from across the political 
spectrum. 
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 After the January 2011 revolution, there was an explosion of graffiti art in Cairo and 
elsewhere in Egypt. As noted by Klaus, this graffiti is “ one of the most visible marks of the 
changes brought about by the revolution of 25 January” (Klaus 11). As he further notes, graffiti 
by the Ultras represented a significant portion of this (Klaus 15). The significance of the Ultras 
graffiti is that the city walls serve as a political message board for the Ultras and other dissident 
groups. There is a unique Egyptian perspective on this because Cairo is a large city with many 
walls and a large percentage of the population is illiterate. Therefore, the graffiti constitutes 
another aspect of the Ultras struggle and efforts to present their grievances and continue their 
struggle.  
 Graffiti has been used by the Ultras to enshrine their political grievances and also as a 
collective memory of their sacrifices during and after the Revolution (Klaus 2014)). As seen 
from the figure below, the acronym ‘UA 07’ stands for the centennial celebration of Ahly club 
from 1907 to 2007, and it shows an image of Ultra protesters emphasizing their strength and 
unity. This can also be seen below by the portrayal of the shamirikh and the emphasis that each 
Ultra member plays a critical part in the club, which is highlighted through the same clothing 
worn by both Ultras, demonstrating that they are members of Al-Ahlawy.  
 
 
	  Ultras	  together	  forever	  graffiti	  on	  Mohamed	  Mahmoud	  Street	  in	  Cairo,	  Source:	  	  	  Arabwy.org:	  “Grafitti:	  Ultras	  07”	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Another iconic image , due to the hooded Ultra throwing shamarikh or fireworks at the 
police, has been painted on numerous walls throughout Egypt (Klaus 2014). This presents one of 
the essential characteristics and iconic images of the Ultras group, which is their clashing with 
the security forces in the streets of Cairo. Give some additional details about how these images 
are viewed by public, supporters, and Ultras themselves. 
As I discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the A.C.A.B (All Cops Are Bastards) movement is a 
political slogan used by the Ultras group to fuel their clashes with the security forces and protests 
during after the Revolution and to marshal and rally their supporters. As the image below shows 
from graffiti near the Ministry of Interior, which is the ministry that oversees the security forces, 
the image of Mubarak has been superimposed on that of the security forces. As noted by one of 
the Ultras Ahlway leaders:  
Graffiti	  on	  Mohammed	  Mahmoud	  Street	  in	  Cairo	  portraying	  the	  Ultras,	  Source:	  After	  the	  Revolution.	  Aslan	  Media:	  “Ultras	  revolution”	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 “The ultras are known to be the only people who can beat up the central security forces. 
The ACAB movement will continue. It’s an unfinished feud between the police and the ultras, 
and we use it to rally the group” (Fareeda Zikry, Personal Interview June 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
This graffiti image memorializes the martyrs of the Port Said massacre, and it also shows 
that most of these members were young. Images of the Port Said martyrs are common throughout 
Egypt (Klaus 17), and they have been used by the Ultras to emphasize that their members were 
Graffiti	  signed	  by	  the	  Ultras	  portraying	  the	  “All	  Cops	  Are	  Bastards”	  movement	  CNN:	  “A.C.AB	  Ultras	  Movement”	  Source:	  CNN	  
	  Wall	  with	  martyrs	  from	  the	  2011	  Revolution,	  most	  of	  whom	  are	  Source:	  Ultras	  Arabwy.org:	  “Grafitti	  of	  Ultras	  Martyrs”	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massacred and that no security or government officials have ever been convicted for these 
crimes. Graffiti as a subversive art has been used by the Ultras as instruments to perpetuate their 
political activism, to memorialize the spirit of the Egyptian Revolution, and to claim public 
spaces throughout Egypt.  
4.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed how the Ultras used organizational strategies, such as core groups 
associated with specific sports to mobilize and organize the Ultras inside and outside the 
stadiums. The leadership structure is not hierarchical or centralized, and this has allowed the 
Ultras to easily adapt this organizational structure as an outlet and mechanism for political 
expression and action outside of the stadiums. This decentralized structure has prevented the 
authorities of focusing on specific leaders, and this has allowed the Ultras to continue to thrive as 
a political force, despite widespread arrests by the security forces. The Ultras have developed 
independent financial funding mechanisms, such as the sale of soccer mementos, kit, and songs, 
to achieve independence and control from the government and other political parties and 
movements. The use of songs, chants, fireworks, and graffiti are all concerted elements of a 
strategy that the Ultras have used to mobilize their members, express their political frustrations 
and objectives, and confront and challenge the government before, during, and after the 2011 
Revolution.  
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
 In this thesis, I analyzed what political ideologies and social and economic factors have 
affected the mobilization of the Ultras, and I assessed whether the Ultras have had specific 
sustainable political objectives and organizational leadership strategies to be viable Egyptian 
political actors.  I used primary sources, based on semi-structured interviews with leading 
academicians, Ultra leaders, and students.  This cross section of academic researchers and Ultra 
leaders provided a perspective and an understanding of the Ultras’ role before, during, and after 
the Egyptian Revolution based on historical analyses, personal experiences and viewpoints. My 
secondary sources included scholarly articles, media sources, chants, and graffiti.  I reviewed the 
literature in terms of a brief history of Egyptian soccer, and its interwoven relations with 
Egyptian politics; the evolution of passionate apolitical soccer fans, the Tersos, into politicized 
Ultras; the authoritarian practices of the Mubarak regime, and how this shaped the political 
response of the Ultras; and the significant role that the Ultras played in the Egyptian 2011 
Revolution and post-Revolution era.  
As my findings indicate, the Ultras are not aligned with any one political movement or 
ideology, but are motivated by a desire for a freedom of expression and a collective sense of 
injustice due to repressive state security practices and poor economic conditions. The Ultras have 
been and continue to be a potent political force in Egypt due to their organizational abilities and 
fearlessness in confronting the government and the security forces. The Ultras’ politization is 
directly related to their continuous challenges to the government security forces, and this spans 
the time period from the early days of the Mubarak regime to the present day. The Ultras were 
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one of the few organized large entities, before the 2011 Revolution, not controlled by the 
government. This has always been viewed by different regimes and the security forces as a threat 
to the government’s stability and survival. Through their long years of confrontations with the 
security forces and the regime, the Ultras have developed street fighting capabilities and street 
survival skills against a formidable array of security forces that included forces from the 
Department of the Interior, the police, the military, and street thugs.  This lack of fear in 
confronting the security elements of different regimes, such as Mubarak’s and the military SCAF 
regime, has been highly significant, because Egyptian political dissidents and opposition parties 
have been, due to their fear of the iron-fisted security authorities, hesitant and incapable of 
confronting the authorities.  This was evident during the 2011 January Revolution, when the 
April 6th Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood recruited the Ultras to confront the security 
forces in Tahrir. They played an essential role in securing Tahrir Square during pitched street 
battles, such as the Battle of the Camels. 
A major reason that the Ultras continue to be a political force is their organizational structure. 
It is a structure predicated on rapid mobilization, independent funding, and adaptable leadership 
structures. The Ultras have used organizational strategies, such as core groups associated with 
specific sports to mobilize and organize the Ultras inside and outside the stadiums. The 
leadership structure is not hierarchical, and this has allowed the Ultras to easily adapt this 
organizational structure as an outlet and mechanism for political expression and action outside of 
the stadiums.  
The Ultras have developed independent financial funding mechanisms, such as the sale of 
soccer mementos, kit, and songs, to achieve financial independence and control from the 
government and other political parties and movements.  The use of songs, chants, fireworks, and 
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graffiti are all concerted elements of a strategy that the Ultras have used to mobilize their 
members, express their political frustrations and objectives, and confront and challenge the 
government before, during, and after the 2011 Revolution. The Ultras are a movement that is 
driven by the slogan of A.C.A.B. (All Cops are Bastards), and that is the political spirit that 
continues to fuel the Ultras to pursue justice and freedom of expression, and to continue clashing 
with the different repressive Egyptian regimes and their security forces.    
For future studies pertaining to this topic, based on my current findings, I would recommend 
that the following areas should be pursued: 
• An investigation of new offshoots of Ultras Ahlawy and White Knights, such as the Ultras 
Morsian and Kerdasa.  Ultras Morsian and Kerdasa are Ultra groups committed to the return of 
the deposed President Morsi. These movements have arisen after the overthrow of President 
Morsi by the military, and it is unclear how powerful this movements are, whether they have the 
shared political goals of the main Ultras groups, and whether they are connected with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other dissident groups.   
• An investigation of how the current Egyptian regime of General Sissi is targeting the Ultras. An 
interesting perspective would be to determine how many Ultras have been imprisoned during the 
crackdowns by Sisi’s regime. Another relevant issue that can be pursued is that some of the 
major clubs in Egypt, such as Al-Zamalek, have asked for government support to target Ultras 
inside and outside soccer stadiums.  
• An analysis of how and whether different Ultra movements in the Arab and Muslim worlds are 
related, and whether they cooperate in achieving specific political goals. For example, a study 
should be conducted to determine if the Egyptian Ultras have influenced the political ideologies 
of Ultras in Arab and Islamic countries, such as Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, and Turkey.  
